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　　　　　　　　Hume’s”General　Point　of　View”
and　Descartes州Clear　and　Distinct　Perception”
Naoki　Yajima
1ntroduction
　　Hume’s　philosophy　is　permeated　by　multiple　layers　of　influences　and
confrontations　with　Cartesian　theories．　He　was　not　only　directly　influenced
by　Descartes　own　writings，　but　by　many　Cartesian　and　anti－Cartesian
philosophers　including　Hobbes，　Malebranche，　Spinoza，　and　Locke．　l　In
particular，　the　theory　of　the　extemal　body　featUres　the　final　stage　in　the
epistemology　of　both　Descartes　and　Hume．　It　is　certain，　however，　that
Cartesian　influences　on　Hume　are　mostly　negative　in　the　sense　that　Hume
attempts　to　replace　the　Cartesian　theory　to　establish　a　kind　of　science
different丘om　Descartes．　Most　fUndamentally，　Hume’s　theory　is　centred　on
perceptions，　while　Descartes’central　principle　ofrecognition　is　reason．
　　Hume　and　Descartes　share　a　similar　concem　regarding　the　standard　of
truth；Descartes　attempts　to　establish　the　standard　of　tue　knowledge，　while
Hume　attempts　to　establish　the　standard　of　true　belief　Hume　replaces　the
Cartesian　system　of　tme　knowledge　with　his　system　of　tnle　belief．　The
Cartesian　clear　and　distinct　recognition　and　the　Humean　general　point　of
view　represent　respectively　the　standard　of　true　knowledge　and　tue　belief，
in　accordance　with　the　difference　of　their　destinations．　The　difference
between　Descartes　and　Hume　is　clearly　shown　in　their　theories　of　extemal
body．　This　paper　highlights　Hume’s　modification　of　Descartes　by　arguing
that　the　general　point　of　view　can　be　understood　as　a　device　for　producing
the　perception　of　external　o切ects，　signified　by　Hume　to　be　the　natural
perception　of　human　beings．　Don　Garrett　calls　the”Separability　Principle”
Hume「s　principle　that”whatever　obj　ects　are　different　are　distinguishable，　and
that　whatever　o切ects　are　distinguishable　are　separable　by　the　thought　and
imagination”．　The”Separability　Principle”can　be　clarified　as　the　principle
fbr　establishing　extemal　o切ects，　and　it　can　be　understood　as　the　Humean
altemative　to　the　Cartesian　principle　of　existence．
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1．The　Cartesian　Standard　of　Truth
　　Let　us　consider　Desca貢es冒theory　of　the　knowledge　of　external　bodies，　and
see　why　and　how　it　starts　from　the　Cogito．　Descartes　is　indisputably　a
fbundationalist．　He　is　unequivocal　about　the　aim　of　his　philosophy：to
establish　the　most　certain　foundation　of　all　knowledge．　He　declares　that：
Archirnedes　used　to　demand　just　one　firm　and　immovable　point　in　order　to
shift　the　entire　eanh；so　I　too　can　hope　for　great　things　if　I　manage　to　find
just　one　thing，　however　slight，　that　is　certain　and　unshakeable．（AT　VII　24；
CSM　II　16）2
Thus　by　his　methodological　doubt，　Descartes　seeks　the　fbundation　of　certain
㎞owledge．　As　a　result，　he　reaches　the　celebrated　conclusion　that”I　am，　I
exist”is　the　tnlth　that　is　beyond　the　most　rigid　doubt．3Descartes　argues　that
”the　I”can　only　be　a　thinking　substance，　and　he　defines”the　I”as”A　thing
that　doubts，　understands，　affirms，　denies，　is　willing，　is　unwilling，　and　also
imagines　and　has　sensory　perceptions”（AT　VII　28；CMS　II　l　9）．4　However，
it　is　important　to　note　that　the　exposition　of　the　self　itself　was　not　Descartesl
final　concem　His　purpose　is　to　present　a　standard　fbr　true　knowledge．
Therefbre，　he　decidedly　argues　that”cogito　ergo　sum”cannot　be　doubted　in
the　least．51t　needs　to　be　noted　that　Descartes　does　not　discover　the　existence
of　the　Cogito　proposition．　Rather，　for　the　first　time　he　proposes　the　Cogito　as
the　true　foundation　of　all　knowledge．　Therefbre，　in　the　first　instance，　the
Cogito　proposition　is　the　only　certain　knowledge　that　can　be　obtained．　But
his　enquiry　does　not　end　here．　Descartes　needs　to　show　that　he　can　deduce
all　other　knowledge　from　the　foundation．　Thus　he　needs　to　demonstrate　the
existence　of　God，　which　guarantees　the　deduction　of　science　from　a
fbundation　ofcertitude．
　　The　problem　of　circularity，　that　is　the　allegation　that　Descartes　asserts　the
necessity　of　recognising　an　existing　God　in　order　to　attain　tr　le　knowledge，
which　is　the　outcome　of　the　clear　perception，　but　he　uses　clear　perception　as
ameans　to　establish　the　existence　of　God，　has　been　one　of　the　fUndamental
problems　in　understanding　Descartes．　Commentators　have　raised　many
questions　about　this　matter．61t　is　important　to　understand　that　the　existence
of　God　is　necessary　fbr　Descartes　to　make　clear　and　distinct　perception
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負mction　as　the　standard　of　tnlth．7　The　Cartesian　Cogito　does　not　mean　the
merely　factUal　proposition　that”I　exist”．　It　more　explicitly　means　that　it　is　an
example　of　certain　knowledge．　Fu貢her　signi丘cant　implications　are　buried　in
this　assertion，　and　Descartes　extends　the　standard　of　clear　and　distinct
perception　to　other　propositions　beyond　the　Cogito．　After　establishing　the
existence　of　God，　clear　and　distinct　perception　becomes　the　basis　fbr
additional　knowledge　which　is　also　granted　by　God．　The　possibility　that
clear　and　distinct　perception　is　not　true　may　be　conceived　only　if　almighty
God　is　a　deceiver　which　is　impossible．　Therefbre，　Descartes　establishes　by
means　of　his　reference　of　God　that　clearness　and　distinctness　as　the　standard
oftruth．8
　　As　revealed　in　the　criticism　of　Leibniz，　Descartes　understands　that　clear
and　distinct　perception　is　not　in　itself　enough　fbr　the　condition　of　truth．9
Thorough　doubt　admits　the　possibility　that　a　demon　may　deceive　him　into
believing　false　knowledge　as　tue．　Descartes’discussion　of　God　has　the　aim
of　answering　this　problem　of　whether　clear　and　distinct　perception　is　true．
By　establishing　the　existence　of　God，　he　can　be　assured　that　the　principle　of
clear　and　distinct　recognition　is　tme．　This　implies　that　there　can　be　no
guarantee　of　the　truth　of　clear　and　distinct　recognition　by　any　human　faculty．
The　possible　falsity　of　clear　and　distinct　recognition　is　that　the　reality　does
not　correspond　to　the　recognition．　Because　God　is　veracious，　he　must
guarantee　that　clear　and　distinct　recognition　corresponds　to　reality．　On　the
other　hand，　if　clear　and　distinct　recognition　is　false，　by　which　is　meant　that
there　is　no　exact　correspondence　between　the　mind　and　the　world，　it　is
because　of　the　use　of丘ee　will　which　is　a　deliberate　disregard　fbr　clear　and
distinct　perception．　In　both　attaining　and　failing　to　attain　the　tmth，　Descartes
shows　that　cleamess　and　distinctness　can　be　the　ultimate　criterion　of　tmth
accessible　to　the　human　mind．　In　this　way，　Descartes　attempts　to　establish
that　clear　and　distinct　recognition　is　different　fピom　a　su切ective　conviction．
The　Cogito　thesis　can　expand　the　meaning　of　truth　as　endorsed　by　the
veracity　of　God．　Therefbre，　the　Cartesian　God　has　a　significant　role　to　play
is　his　system．　Because　of　the　link　between　truth　and　God，　indubitable
perception　is　good　and　unfailing　as　a　basis　fbr　the　natural　sciences．
　　After　discussing　the　validity　of　theoretical　perception，　Descartes　attempts
to　establish　the　existence　of　the　extemal　world．　According　to　Descartes，
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because　the　existence　of　the　mind　is　self－evident，　it　is　different丘om　the
existence　of　the　body．　This　means　that　the　existence　of　body　must　be
established　differently．　Precisely　because　material　things　are　different丘om
the　mind　which　is　self－evident，　their　existence　cannot　be　demonstrated　to　be
the　product　of　clear　and　distinct　perception．　Here，　Descartes　resorts　to　God，
who　is　almighty　and　veracious，　and　is　capable　of　making　things　exist　as　we
recognise　clearly　and　distinctly．　Descartes　says：
Because　1　know　that　all　that　1　clearly　and　distinctly　understand　can　be
brought　about　by　God　as　I　understand　it，　it　is　enough　tllat　I　can　clearly　and
distinctly　understand　one　thillg　apart丘om　another，　f（）r　me　to　be　certain　that
one　is　different　apart　from　another，　because　they　can　be　placed　apart　at　lease
by　God；and　it　does　not　matter　by　which　power　this　is　done，　ill　order　fbr　us　to
judge　them　to　be　different；｛md　thus，丘om　this　very飴ct，　that　1　know　1　exist，
and　that　meanwhile　I　notice　thing，　I　rightly　conclude　that　my　essence
consists　in　this　one［thing］that　1　am　a　thinking　thing．（AT　VII　78；CSM　II
54）
Based　on　this　principle，　Descartes　explains　the”distinctio　realis”（real
distinction）（AT　VIII　28；CSM　I　213）between　mind　and　body．　Thus　body
can　exist　as　far　as　he　recognises　it　with　the　clarity　of　mathematical　truth．　It　is
extemal　to　the　human　mind．　In　this　way，　Descartes　shows　the　possibility　of
the　existence　of　the　external　world　as　extension，　as　the　object　of
mathematical　understanding．
　　Using　his　notions　of　the　Cogito　and　God，　Descartes　attempts　to
demonstrate　the　existence　of　the　extemal　world．　Descartes’demonstration　of
the　existence　of　extemal　o切ects　depends　on　the　existence　of　mind　and　the
veracity　of　God．　He　identifies”ideas”as　the　material　of　thinking．　Because
the　mind　is　a　purely　thinking　substance，　it　contains　no　extemal　materiaL
Therefbre，　the　representational　content　or　what　he　calls”rea1ゴtas　objective”
（objective　reality）（AT　VII　l67；CSM　II　l　l8）must　have　its　cause
somewhere．10　Descartes　observes　that　nature　has　given　us　a”great
propensitジto　believe　in　the　existence　of　the　extemal　world　through　the
working　of　sensation　and　imagination．　The　cause　cannot　be　the　mind　itself，
because　mind　is　clearly　and　distinctly　distinguished　from　the　body，　the
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perception　of　which　is　passive　and　involuntary．　The　cause　cannot　be　God，
because　it　would　make　God　a　deceiver．　Therefbre，　the　bodies　must　exist　as
the　cause　of　the　perceptions　of　them．　In　other　words，　Descartes　concludes
that　we　must　recognise　that　the　external　world　exists，　in　so　far　as　it　is　the
cause　ofour　clear　and　distinct　recognition．
　　In　this　way，　Descartes　deduces　the　recognition　of　the　extemal　world　by
reasoning．　As　a　negative　consequence　of　this　reasoning，　Descartes　separates
every　quality　of・human　sensations　from　extemal　o切ects，　which　is　later
named　by　Boyle　and　others　as　secondary　qualities．　The　de－animation　of
physical　objects　was　a　conclusion　that　Descartes　required　in　order　to
establish　a　new　science．　For　Descartes，　the　existence　of　extemal　bodies　is　the
least　certain　of　the　clear　and　distinct　perceptions．　Therefbre，　it　behoves　us　to
examine　Hume’s　alteration　of　this　theory　of　the　existence　ofextemal　bodies．
2．Hume曹s　Concept　of韓Existence，サ
　　Hume　discusses　the　existence　of　extemal　o切ects　after　the　discussion　of
causation．　He　begins　his　discussion　with　his　trademark　question，　asking
whether　or　not　we　have　impressions　corresponding　to　their　existence．　Hume
is　confident　when　he　states　that”So　far　from　there　being　any　distinct
impression，　attending　every　impression　and　every　idea，　that　I　do　not　think
there　are　any　two　distinct　impressions，　which　are　inseparably　conj　oin’d”（T
1．2．6．3；SBN　66）．11　Hume，　however，　is　making　not　an　ontological　but　an
epistemic　claim：our　perception　of　existence　is　no　different丘om　other
perceptions．　There　is　no　other　means　fbr　us　to　reach　existence　other　than　via
perceptions．　Hume　says，
Let　us　fb（our　attention　out　of　ourselves　as　much　as　possible：Let　us　chase
our㎞ag童nation　to　the　heavens，　or　to　the　utmost　limits　of　the　universe；we
never　really　advance　a　step　beyond　ourselves，　nor　can　conceive　any　kmd　of
existence，　but　those　perceptions，　which　have　appear’d　in　that　narrow
cornpass．　This　is　the　universe　of　imagination，　nor　have　we　any　idea　but　what
is　there　produc，d（T　1．2．6．8；SBN　67－68）．
　　This　is　virtually　a　declaration　that　unlike　Descartes　Hume　will　not　go丘om
ideas　to　existence，　and　confines　his　theory　to　the　boundary　of　perceptions．
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Hume　holds　that　impressions　of　sensations　arise”in　the　soul　originally，丘om
unknown　causes”（T　l．1．2．1；SBN　7）．　Hume，s．　problem　is　not　to　deduce　real
existence丘om　ideas，　but　to　explain　the　perception　of　extemal　existence．　He
transfers　the　problem　from”what　is　out　of　the　mind’層to”how　perceptions
create　what　is　out　there”．　For　Hume，　perception　is　a　fundamental　given．
Hume，s　is　not　a　causal　theory，　nor　is　it　a　representative　theory　which
supPoses　the　o切ects　of　perception　to　exist　independently　of　perceptions．
What　matters　for　us　in　our　common　life　is　not　the　ontological　constitUtion　of
existence，　but　the　perception　of　existing　things．　Hume　tries　to　explain　what　it
is　that　we　believe　to　exist．
　　Usually，　ordinary　people－the　Humean”vulgar”－think　that　things　exist
outside　of　their　minds．　Perception　is　naturally　taken　to　be　about　something
external．　However，丘om　the　Humean　perspective，　perceptions　constitute　the
mind．　Hume　begins　from　a　philosophical　premise　and　proceeds　to　show　how
the　final　construction　is　produced，　the　latter　being　something　which　is
already　at　hand．　Humels　task　is　to　explain，丘om　the　given　facts，　the　real
nature　of　the　concept　of　existence．　How　it　is　that　we　come　to　entertain　the
concept　of　existence　as　we　do，　though　we　in　fact　have　only　perceptions．　First
　　　　　　　　　　　も
Hume　needs　to　indicate　the　nature　ofthe　problem　itse1£He　says，
The　farthest　we　can　go　towards　a　conception　of　extemal　o切ects，　when
suppos’d　specifically　different　from　our　perceptions，　is　to鉤㎜arelative　idea
of　them，　without　pretending　to　comprehend　the　related　o切ects．　Generally
speaking　we　do　not　suppose　them　specifically　dif財ent；but　only　a面bute　to
them　different　relations，　comexions｛md　durations．（T　l．2．6．9；SBN　68）
　　This　shows　that　Hume曾s　objective　is　not　to　argue　fbr　or　against　the
existence　of　the　extemal　o切ects，　but　to　explain　how　our　idea　ofthe　existence
of　extemal　o切ects　is　composed　out　of　impressions　and　ideas．　This　means
that　there　is　nothing　that　produces　the　understanding　of　existence　other　than
perceptions．　Hume　is　theref（）re　attempting　to　provide　an　explanation　of　our
common　understanding　ofexistence　which　is丘㎜ly　based　on　perceptions．
　　Hume’s　theory　of　extemal　o切ects　is　principally　developed　in　the　section
titled”Of　scepticism　with　regard　to　the　senses”．　This　section　is　preceded　by
its　twin　argument　titled”Of　scepticism　with　regard　to　reason”．　It　is　important
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to　understand　the　second　argument　on　the　basis　of　the　first．　In”Of　scepticism
with　regard　to　reason”，　Hume　examines　the　system　of　philosophy　that　relies
on　reason．　Clearly，　he　aims　to　criticise　Descartes，　among　others，　who
proposes　reason　as　the　foundation　of　all　certain　knowledge．　Hume　does　not
deny　the　certainty　of”the　rules”of　reason，　but　is　concerned　with　our
application　of　the　rules　to　real　situations　in　which　real　human　activities　are
directed　towards　dealing　with　tnlth．　For　Hume，　no　mle　can　play　its　role　in
our　life　without　our　applying　it　to　reality．　Hume　claims　that　ever　in　the
accumulation　of　a　large　number　of　trials　there　emerges　a　possibility　of　error．
He　argues　that　all　human　knowledge　is　empirical　and　is　subject　to
probability．　Hume　argues　that　in　any　reasoning　there　is　a　possibility　of　error，
and　therefbre”all　knowledge　is　denigrated　into　probability”，　which　leads　to
”continual　diminution，　and　at　last　a　total　extinction　of　belief　and　evidence”
（T1．4．1．6；SBN　l83）．　Hume　takes　the　example　of　mathematics　and
maintains，”there　scarce　is　any　proposition　conceming　numbers，　of　which　we
can　have　a　fUller　security．ll　According　to　Hume，　even　mathematics，　which
Descartes　uses　as　a　paradigm　fbr　his　conclusions，　is　also　a　matter　of
probability　in　so　far　as　any　human　commitment　is　involved．　This　is　a
challenge　to　the　Cartesian　principle　of’，clear　and　distinct”perception　as　the
foundation　of　knowledge．　Hume　does　not　accept　clear　and　distinct
perception　as　the　criterion　of　truth　because　it　can　be　a　strong　but　false
conviction　without　fUrther　assurance．
　　Once　we　are　trapped　in　scepticism，　the　conflict　between　the冒’sceptical　and
dogmatical　reasons”continues　until”both　vanish　away　into　nothing”（T
l．4．1．12；SBN　l　87）．　This　argument　reveals　Hume’s　true　intention　here，
which　lies　in　answering　the　question”how　it　happens…that　these　arguments
above－explain’d　produce　not　a　total　suspense　of　judgement，　and　after　what
manner　the　mind　ever　retains　a　degree　of　assurance　in　any　su切ect？”（T
l．4．1．9；SBN　184）．　Hume　ascribes　the　attainment　of　assurance　in　this　matter
to　the　working　of　nature．　It　is　remarkable　that　at　the　height　of　his　sceptical
argument　Hume　tUrns　to　the　workings　of　natUre．　Nature”breaks　the　fbrce　of
all　sceptical　arguments　in　time，　and　keeps　them　from　having　any
considerable　influence　on　the　understanding”（T　1．4．1．12；SBN　187）．　This
idea　parallels　Hume冒s　account　of　causation　where　he　ascribes　what　is　usually
taken　to　be　the　working　of　reason　to　the”sensitive”（T　1．4．1．8；SBN　183）
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part　of　our　nature．　In　fact，　all　of　his　arguments　in　the　Treatise　aim　to　explore
how　the　principle　of　nature　solves　the　otherwise　insoluble　problems　of
reason　in　human　matters．　This　basic　conviction　is　persistent　also　in　his
dealings　with　the　existence　of　the　extemal　obj　ect．　Although　reason　cannot
defend　the　principle　conceming　the　existence　of　body，　the　sceptic　is　not
allowed　to　doubt　it，　because
Nature　has　not　lefhhis　to　his　choice，　and　has　doubtless　esteem’d　it　an　affair
of　too　great　importance　to　be　trusted　to　our　uncertain　reasonings　and
speculations．　We　may　well　ask，　n7hat　cazLses　induce　us　to　believe　in　the
exis彪nce（～ズわ04ソ2　but’tis　in　vain　to　asK　Pthether　thereわe　bo4ソor　not2　This
is　a　point，　which　we　must　take　for　granted　in　all　our　reasonings．（T　1．4．2．1；
SBN　l87）
　　In　T　l．2．6．，　Hume　also　r（）jects　the　Berkeleyan　identification　of　ideas　with
being，　because　simply　replacing　materials　with　ideas　does　not　explain　the
魚ct　that　there　seems　to　be　an　external　obj　ect　around　us　that　is　distinct　from
ideas．　When　he　first　af行rms　the　existence　of　the　objects　of　perceptions，
Hume　does　not　mean　that　the　objects　exist　independently．　However　in
general　claiming　the　existence　of　o切ects　commonly　entails　claiming　that　the
o切ect　is　distinct　from　the　perception　itself　Accordingly，　Hume　goes　on　to
explore　how　it　is　possible　that　o切ects　of　perception　exist”extemally”．　He
asks　how　it　is　that　we　come　to　believe　that　there　is　an　o切ect　that　is　diffbrent
丘om　perception．　Regarding　this　he　says，”our　present　enquiry　is　conceming
the　causes　which　induce　us　to　believe　in　the　existence　of　body”（T　1．4．2．2；
SBN　187－88）．
　　Now　Hume　has　a　premise　and　a　conclusion：we　only　have　impressions
and　ideas，　and　we　in　fact　believe　in　the　existence　of　bodies．　Hume，s　task　is　to
bridge　the　gap　between　the　fbundation　of　his　epistemology，　perceptions，　and
our　compelling　natural　belief　in　extemal　bodies．　Hume　explores　the　full
scope　of　this　thesis　with　regard　to　human　nature．　The　key　difficulty　however
is　that　extemal　o切ects　seems　to　possess　some　qualities　that　are　dif飴rent
倉om　our　perception．
　　In　order　to　explore　the　nature　of　extemal　o切ects，　Hume　distinguishes　two
more　specific　beliefs　that　we　have　regarding　extemal　o切ects，　namely，　that
Hume’s’”General　Point　ofView”　and　Descartes’　’℃lear　and　Distinct　Perception”　37
they　have　a　distinct　existence　from　us，　and　secondly・that　they　have　a
continued　existence．　Hume　asks：
why　we　attribute　a　CONTINU’D　existence　to　o切ects，　even　when　they　are
not　present　to　the　senses；and　why　we　suppose　them　to　have　an　existence
DISTINCT　from　the　mind　and　perception？Under　this　last　head　I
comprehend　their　situation　as　well　as　relations，　their　extemal　position　as　well
as　the　hldependence　of　theh夢existence　and　opera廿on．　These　two（luestions
conceming　the　continu’d　and　distinct　existence　of　body　are　intimately
connected　together．　For　if　the　ohl　ects　of　our　senses　conthlue　to　exist，　even
when　they　are　not　perceiv，d，　their　existence　is　of　course　i　ldependent　of　and
distinct　fbom　the　perception；and　vゴce・versa，　if　their　existence　be　independent
of　the　perception　and　distinct　from　it，　they　must　continue　to　exist，　even　thd
they　be　not　perceiv，d．（T　1．4．2．2；SBN　188）
In　other　words，　the　belief　in　the　existence　of　the　external　obj　ect　is　elucidated
as　continued　and　independent　existence．　Hume　strategically　retains　this
distinction，　and　tries　to　show　that　continued　existence　is　entailed　by　distinct
existence．121t　is　crucial　to　understand　the　implication　of　this　distinction；
mere　continued　existence　signifies　an　inert　o切ect，　whereas　independent
existence　signifies　a　lively　object．
　　As　Descartes　does，　Hume　questions　which　faculty　of　the　human　mind，　the
senses1C　reason，　or　the　imagination　produces　the　belief　in　the　continued
existence　of　obj　ects．　To　take　the　conclusion　first，　Hume　shows　that　the　belief
is　not　the　product　of　the　senses，　nor　of　reason，　but　of　imagination．　First，　the
senses　carmot　produce　the　belief　in　the　continued　existence　of　their　objects，
because　they　deal　with　perceptions　only　in　so　far　as　they　appear　to　the
senses．　In魚ct，　sense　cannot　even　underpin　the　belief　in　distinct　existence，
fbr　it　is　evident　that”our　senses　o脆r　not　their　impressions　as　the　images　of
something　distinct，　or　independent，　and　external，　because　they　convey　to　us
nothing　but　a　single　perception”．　In　order　to　have　an　impression　of　an
independent　o切ect，　we　have　to　sense　every　aspect　of　the　object　at　once；the
independence　of　our　perceptions　from　ourselves　can　never　be　an　o切ect　of
perception．　Therefbre，　Hume　asserts　that　a”single　perception　can　never
produce　the　idea　of　a　double　existence，　but　by　some　inference　either　of　the
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reason　or　imagination”．　Moreover，　Hume　claims　that　if　the　senses　were　to
produce　the　belief　in　the　independent　existence　of　o切ects，　they　must　show　at
the　same　time　the”relation　and　situation”（T　1．4．2．4；SBN　l　89）between　the
o切ects　and　our　impressions．　It　is　significant　that　Hume　questions　not　the
perception　of　extemal　things，　but　tums　his　fUndamental　scepticism　to　the
relation　of　the　perceptions　to　extemality．　Therefbre，　what　is　established　as　an
extemal　o切ect　in　the　end　is　not　the　perceptions　of　extemal　things，　but　more
且1ndamentally　the　relation　of　the　extemality　ofour　perceptions．
　　Specifying　the　exact　meaning　of”extemality”poses　a　problem：Hume
asks　with　respect　to　what　an　object　must　be　positioned　in　order　to　be
external．”ExternaP’does　not　mean　spatially　distant　f「om　the”body”，
because　the　body　is　also　an　extemal　existence．　What　is　perceived　as　extemal
existence　is　the　same　o切ect　of　perceptions　that　exists　in　the　absence　of　the
perception．　This　does　not　mean　that　there　exists　something　that　is　different
丘om　perception，　however：Hume’s　theory　does　not　recognise　independent
existence　as　the　cause　of　perception．　The　emergence　of　extemality　in　fact
means　there　must　be　established　a　point　of　view　that　regards　an　o切ect　as
extemal　and　is　cmcial　to　understand　what　this　point　ofview　is．
3．The　General　Point　of　View　and　Externa1　Bodies
　　In　this　matter　Hume　takes　a　different　path　from　Descartes　and　Locke，　and
attempts　to　explore　the　working　of　imagination　to　explain　our　belief　in
external　objects．　Since　not　all　impressions　generate　the　notion　of　their
distinct　and　continued　existence，　it　is　necessary　to　explain　which　kinds　of
impressions　do　cooperate　with　the　imagination　to　produce　this　notion．
Clearly，　it　is　not　those　characterised　by”involuntariness”，”superior　fbrce”，
and”violence”（T　l．4．2．16；SBN　l　94）．　For，　says　Hume，旧tis　evident　our
pains　and　pleasures，　our　passions　and　affections，　which　we　never　suppose　to
have　any　existence　beyond　our　perception，　operate　with　greater　violence，
and　are　equally　involuntary，　as　the　impressions　of　figure　and　extension，
colour　and　sound，　which　we　supposed　to　be　permanent　beings”（T　l．4．2．16；
SBN　194）．　Another　hypothesis　is　therefbre　required．　It　is　apparent　that　this　is
abasic　idea　in　Hume電s　theory　of　belief．　Merely　involuntary，　strong，　and
violent　beliefs　are　not　in　themselves　a　reliable　guide　fbr　understanding　the
world　and　our　behaviour．　This，　I　shall　argue，　introduces　the　possibility　that
Hume’s”General　Point　ofView”　and　Descartes’　”Clear　and　Distinct　Perception”　39
Hume’s　search　fbr　the”manner”in　which　some　perceptions　constitute　our
belief　in　the　extemal　o切ect　also　clarifies　the　notion　of　a　valid　belief　in
moralS．
　　Hume　observes　that”all　those　o切ects，　to　which　we　attribute　a　continu’d
existence，　have　a　peculiar　constancy”（T　1．4．2．18；SBN　194）．　By
”constancy”，　Hume　means　appearance”in　the　same　order”，　or　presence”in
the　same　uniform　manner”．　It　is　to　be　remembered　that　causation　depends　on
asimilar　notion　of”constant　cor噸unction”．　Most　significantly，　continued
existence　is　fbunded　on　the　relation　of　resemblance．　But　there　is　a　problem
in　thinking　of　constancy　as　the　essential　characteristic　of　things　possessing
continued　existence，　because　constancy”is　not　so　pe㎡fect　as　not　to　admit　of
very　considerable　exceptions．　Bodies　often　change　their　position　and
qualities，　and　after　a　little　absence　or　interruption　may　become　hardly
knowable”（T　1．4．2．19；SBN　195）．　Hume　holds　that　coherence　within
changes　which　the　perceived　o切ects　undergo　has　a　better　chance　of　the
defining　the　characteristic　of　external　obj　ects．
　　The　coherence　of　appearance　cannot　be　obtained　from　reasoning
concerning　causes　and　effects，　fbr　there　is　no　causal　regularity　in　the
impression　of　extemal　o切ects，”since　the　tuning　about　of　our　head，　or　the
shutting　of　our　eyes　is　able　to　break　it”（T　1．4．2．21；SBN　198）．　The
coherence　of　appearance　is　supported　primarily　by　the　understanding，　and
only　indirectly　by　custom，　because　custom　cannot　be　obtained　fヒom　what
was　never　present　in　the　mind．”There　is　scarce　a　moment　in　my　life”，　Hume
confesses，　where”I　have　not　occasion　to　suppose　the　continu’d　existence　of
o切ects”（T　1．4．2．20；SBN　197）．　Therefbre，　it　is　doubtfUl　that　the　extemal
object　is　the　product　of　an　inference　ofthe　u皿derstanding．　The　supPosition　of
external　objects　should　be　the　result　of　a　more　natural　mental　fUnction　than
the　result　of　inference．　It　is　true　that　we　certainly　suppose　the　continued
existence　of　o切ects，　which　is　not　the　direct　and　natural　effect　of　constant
repetition　and　connection，　but”must　arise　from　the　co－operation　of　some
other　principle”（T　l．4．2．21；SBN　l98）．　The　idea　of　coherence　needs　the
hypothesis　of　the　continuing　existence　of　o切ects，　but　coherence　is”too　weak
to　supPort　alone　so　vast　an　edifice，　as　is　that　of　the　continu’d　existence　of　all
extemal　bodies”（T　1．4．2．23；SBN　l　98－99）．　Hume　thinks”we　must　l　oin　the
constancy　of　their［extemal　bodies，］appearance　to　the　coherence，　in　order　to
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give　a　satisfactory　account　of　that　opinion．”However，　the　constancy　of　our
perceptions鴨gives　rise　to　the　opinion　of　the　continu　’d　existence　of　body，
which　is　prior　to　that　of　its　distinct　existence，　and　produces　that　latter
principle”（T　l．4．2。23；SBN　199）．　Hume　provides　us　with”a　short　sketch”of
his　theory　as　fbllows．
When　we　have　been　accustom，d　to　observe　a　constancy　in　certain
impressions，　and　have　fbund，　that　the　perception　of　the　sun　or　ocean，　fbr
instance，　returns　upon　us　after　an　absence　or　annihilation　with　1ike　parts　and
in　a　like　order，　as　at　its　first　appearance，　we　are　not　apt　to　regard　these
interrupted　perceptions　as　different，（which　they　really　are）but　on　the
contrary　consider　them　as　individually　the　same，　upon　account　of　their
resemblance．　But　as　this　intemmption　of　their　existence　is　contrary　to　their
pe㎡bct　identity，　and　makes　us　regard　the　f　rrst　impression　as　annihilated，　and
the　second　as　newly　created，　we　find　ourselves　somewhat　at　a　loss，　and　are
involv，d　in　a　kind　of　contradiction．　In　order　to／cree　ourselvesプ》o〃1　this
姻c吻，we　disguise，　as　much　as　possible，　the　intemption，　or　rather
remove　it　entirely，　by　supposing　that　these　intemlpted　perceptions　are
connected　by　a　real　existence，　of　which　we　are　hlsensible．　This　supposition，
or　idea　of　continu’d　existence，　acquires　a　fbrce　and　vivacity　from　the
memory　of　these　broken　impressions，　and丘om　that　propensity，　which　they
give　us，　to　suppose　them　the　same；and　according　to　the　precedent　reasoning，
the　very　essence　of　belief　consists　in　the　fbrce　and　vivacity　of　the
conception．（T　1．4．2．24；SBN　199，　italics　mine）
　　The　significant　point　is　that　we，　by　the　natural　tendency　of　the
imagination，　tend　to　regard　interrupted，　but　resembling，　perceptions　as
connected　in　order　to　save　us　the　trouble　of　treating　them　as　different．
Custom　is　indifferent　to　the　truth－value　of　reason．　We　may　be　uncertain
about　the　essence　of　each　perception，　but　it　is　impossible　to　question　all　of
them，　all　of　the　time．　Most　importantly，　the　underlying　principle　of　the　belief
in　the　external　object　is　fundamentally　the　same　as　that　of　treating　a
particular　impression　as　belonging　to　a　wider　class　of　perceptions．　The
manner　we　imagine　external　obj　ects，　which　are　distinct，　is　also　closely
related　to　the　principle　of　taking　the　general　point　of　view　in　moral
Hume’s　l，General　Point　ofView’1組d　Desc頒esu℃lear細d　Distinct　Perception”41
judgement，　which　consists　in　avoiding　contradiction　and　arriving　at　a　stable
judgement．13
　　Hume　arrives　at　the　assertion　that”When　the　exact　resemblance　of　our
perceptions　makes　us　ascribe　to　them　an　identity，　we　may　remove　the
seeming　intemlption　byプlligning　a　continu’d　being，　which　may　fill　those
intervals，　and　preserve　a　perfect　and　entire　identity　to　our　perception”（T
l．4．2．40；SBN　208，　italic　mine）．　Feigning　the　continued　existence　of　the
obj　ects　of　perception　is，　therefbre，　the　means　whereby　the　mind　attains
stability．　It　is　a　fiction　but　does　no　harm　to　the　mind　because　it曾曾involves　no
contradiction”（T　l．4．2．40；SBN　208）．　Once　the　fiction　of　the　independent
o切ect　is　established，　it　is　supPosed　to　possess　different　qualities，　and　thus　it
is　easy　to　believe　that　it　exerts　different　causal　effects．
　　However，　it　is　not　enough　to　feign　continued　existence．　We　must　also　in
魚ct　believe　the　fiction　to　be　real．　So　Hume　proceeds　to　answer　a　fUrther
question；’from　whence　arises　suchαbelief，　that　we”not　only／ilign　but
belieソθthis　continu’d　existence”．　The　difference　betWeen　an　idea　and　belief
lies　in　its　vivacity．”The　relation　causes　a　smooth　passage　from　the
impression　to　the　idea，　and　even　gives　a　propensity　to　that　passage”（T
l．4．2．41；SBN　208）．
　　As　in　Hume’s　theory　of　causation，　and　also　in　his　theory　of　sympathy，　the
perception　of　resemblance　confers　vivacity　to　the　idea．　The　idea　of
continued　existence　obtains　vivacity　through　the　memory　of　accumulated
experiences．　The　general　point　of　view　is　involved　here　in　recognising　the
resemblance，　and　it　becomes　clear　that　the　belief　in　continued　existence　is　a
means　to”avoid　the　contradiction”．　Hume　also　explains　why　we　believe　in
the　continued　existence　of　new　obj　ects．
If　sometimes　we　ascribe　a　continu’d　existence　to　o切ects，　which　are　perfbctly
new　to　us，　and　of　whose　constancy　and　coheren6e　we　have　no　experience，
’tis　because　the　manner，　in　which　they　present　themselves　to　our　senses，
resembles　that　of　cons伽t　and　coherent　obj　ectS；and血is　rese血blance　is　a
source　of　reasoning　and　analogy，　and　leads　us　to　attribute　the　same　qualities
to　the　similar　o切㏄ts．（T　l．4．2．42；SBN　209）
It　is　because　of　neither　the　content，　nor　the　violence，　but　the”manner，　in
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which　they　present　themselves　to　our　senses”that　we　ascribe　a　continued
existence　to　objects．　It　is　impossible　to　emphasise　the　importance　of
”manner”C　not”content”，　as　the　standard　that　distinguishes　reliable　belief
倉om　mere　fiction　in　Hume．　The　perception　of　an　extemal　o切ect　is　the　result
of　the　manner　in　which　we　have　treated　the　perceptions　of　similar　o切ects．
Thus，　as　in　the　case　of　the　classification　of　ideas，　in　which　a　new　idea　is
classified　the　same　as　already　experienced　ideas　that　resembles　them，　new
o切ects　are　believed　to　have　continued　existence　in　so　far　as　they　resemble
other　objects　that　are　supPosed　to　have　continued　existence．　Once　the
continued　existence　is　established，　it　is　naturally　converted　as　distinct
existence．　Though　continued　and　distinct　existence　is　a且ction　of　the
imagination，　Human　beings　base　their　behaviour　on　this　convenient　fiction．
We　come　to　believe　this　fiction　and　behave　as　if　it　were　real．　Thus，　the
general　point　of　view　represents　the　manner　perceptions　are　constnlcted　by
imagination　to　produce　continued　and　distinct　o切ects．14
　　According　to　Humels　Separability　Principle，”whatever　objects　are
different　are　distinguishable，　and　that　whatever　o切ects　are　distinguishable
are　separable　by　the　thought　and　imagination”（T　l．1．7．3；SBN　l　8）．　Hume
shows　that　external　objects　are　recognised　as　being　different　and
distinguishable　when　seen　from　the　general　point　of　view．　Hume　does　not
recognise　the　Cartesian　urge　to　establish　external　bodies　as　substances．　It　is
enough　fbr　Hume’s　science　of　man　to　explain　the　external　body　as　the
Cartesian”distinctio　modalis”（modal　distinction）（AT　VIII　29；CSM　I　213）．
The　general　point　of　view　represents　the　manner　or　the”mode”of
perceptions．　External　objects　need　not　exist　as　substance，　but　o．nly
distinguished　by　thought　and　imagination．　The　o切ects　that　are　perceived　as
di　ffe　rent　by　the　general　point　of　view　are　taken　to　be　distinguished　on
Humels　Separability　Principle．　In　this　way，　Hume　explains　how　the”great
propensity”（AT　VII　79－80；CSM　II　55）about　recognising　the　external　body
arises．　It　is　a　point　Descartes　ascribes　to　God．
4．The　Mora1　Significance　of　the　Belief　of　External　Bodies　in　Hume
　　Let　us　consider　the　underlying　moral　implications　of　Hume，s　theory　of
external　l）odies．’5　First，　as　in　other　major　topics，　Hume’s　argument
concerning　the　existence　of　external　obj　ects　is　a　theory　of　belie£This　is　in
Hume’s　”General　Point　ofView”　and　Descartes，　”Clear　and　Distinct　Perception”　43
clear　contrast　to　Descartes’theory　about　scientific　knowledge　of　external
bodies．　Hume　clarifies　that　to　have　a　belief　in　the　external　object　is　to
believe　in　the　continued　and　distinct　existence　of　o切ects．　He　asserts　that　this
idea　is　a　fiction，　and　this　is　a　conclusion　which　makes　him　appear　sceptical．
But　this　epistemic　scepticism　does　not　have　any　destmctive　power　in　moral
matters．　No　matter　what　reason　asserts，　the　natural　belief　in　the　existence　of
external　o切ects　is　ineradicable．　In　this　way，　Hume　establishes　the　priority　of
the　working　of　human　nature　over　reason　fbr　producing　an　understanding　of
the　world．　Most　important　of　al1，　Hume　indicates　a　significant　departure
丘om　the　Cartesian　concept　of”certainty”．　While　fbr　Descartes　it　is　reason
that　produces　certainty，　Hume　asserts　that　the　sense　of　certainty　is　derived
丘om　the　imagination；imagination　produces　the　belief　in　the　existence　of　a
supposed　extemal　o切ect，　by　which　we　obtain　a　stable　view　of　the　world：
that　is，　a　belief　in　the　independent，　unchanging　existence　of　o切ects．　Hume
calls　these　continued　and　distinct　o切ects　which　constitute　the　content　of　the
most　stabile　and　reliable　form　ofbelief　Fu曲e㎜ore，　reliable　beliefs　provide
one　with　the　circumstance　in　which　to　engage　in　one’s　more　particular
activities．16　No　purposefUl　and　consistent　activities　are　possible　without　the
belief　in　the　stability　of　extemal　world．　We　obtain　a　sense　of　certainty　fbr　the
first　time　from　the　perception　of　external　obj　ects．　This　is　in　a　sha叩contrast
to　Descartes　who　insists　that　only　reason　can　assure　the　certainty　of
㎞owledge．
　　It　is　significant　that　the　basic　concept　of”o切ectivity”derives丘om　the
belief　in　extemal　bodies．171t　is　impossible　to　overemphasise　the　importance
of　this　concept．　Obj　ectivity　signifies　our　common　picture　of　the　world　which
is　composed　of　independent　o切ects．　The　concept　also　produces　our　common
notion　that　each　o切ect　has　its　own　structure　and　qualities．0切ectivity　is
constituted　by　general　ideas　that　represent　existences，　and　on　which　is　based
an　absolutely　fUndamental　reliance　in　the　world．　By　obtaining　the　notion　of
o切ectivity，　the　notion　of　su切ectivity　also　emerges，　fbr　objectivity　and
su切ectivity　mutually　imply　each　other．層’Su切ectivity”can　be　defined　as
perceptions　that　do　not　fbrm　beliefs　in　independently　existing　o切ects．
Insofar　as　they　are　perceptions，　they　are　no　di・fferent　from”objective”
perceptions：they　lack　only　the　specific　manner　of　appearing　needed　to
produce　the　fiction　of　independent　existence．i8
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　　Apart　from　the　specific　manner　in　which　they　appear，　pleasure　and　pain
which　are　considered　paradigmatically　subjective　perceptions　are　no
different丘om　colour　or　other”o切ective”perceptions．　Thus　Hume　explains
the　perception　of　external　o切ects　as　the　working　of　human　nature，　and
prepares　us　fbr　his　explanation　ofmoral　sentiment，　as　a　particular　pleasure　or
pain，　as　the　standard　fbr　moral　judgement．　The　principle　that　underlies，　and
partially　constitutes，　the　idea　of　the　extemal　ohject　is　again　proven　to　be　the
general　point　of　view，　which　assures　that　things　are　perceived　in　the
particular　manner　inherent　to　o切ective　perception．
　　The　relation　of　resemblance　has　an　equally　significant　role　to　play　here　as
it　does　in　the　case　of　abstract　ideas．　Resemblance　consists　in　seeing　one
particular　in　association　with　other　particulars．　Thus，　belief　in　the　extemality
of　o切ects　consists　in　the　point　of　view　which　treats　different　perceptions　as
signifying　the　same　o切ect，　rather　than　in　the　theoretical　structure　of　the
perceptions　themselves，　which　it　is　in　fact　impossible　to　identify　because
what　appears　to　us　is　always　changing．　Only　because　of　the　general　point　of
view，　external　things　are　perceived　as　stable，　which　is　the　hallmark　of
nature．19
　　Locke　thought　that　for　there　to　be　obj　ective　moral　truth，　that　truth　must　be
discoverable　through　reason　alone．20　Hume　provides　an　altemative　to　this
idea　by　showing　that　the　alleged　externality　of　perceptions　is　a　fiction　of　the
imagination．　Even　if　the　notion　of　o切ectivity　is　a　scientific　hypothesis，　the
problem　is　how　and丘om　where　we　obtain　the　hypothesis　in　the　first　place．
The　consequences　of　rationalist　theory　therefbre　are　the　neglect　of
convention，　sentiments，　and　human　na加re，　which　Hume　places　at　the　cen甘e
of　his　entire　system．　This　is　why　Hume　persistently　criticises　reason　as　a
principle　in　moral　matters．　In　this　way，　his　epistemology　can　be　regarded　as
preparing　the　ground　fbr　his　moral　theory．
　　Vulgar　people　arrive　at　a　mistaken　belief　in　o切ectivity　by　tracing　a
natural　course　from　the　notion　of　a　continued　o切ect　to　the　notion　of　a
distinctly　existing　object．　But　the　objectivity　alleged　by　this”false
philosophy”inevitably　results　in　falsehood，　because　it　has　no　other　means
but　to　smuggle　its　tmth　surreptitiously丘om　imagination　whose　credibility　it
officially　despises．21
　　Although　continued　existence　and　distinct　existence　imply　each　other，
Hume’s”Gene皿l　Point　ofViewll　and　Desc飢es”℃le肛and　Distinct　Perception”45
distinct　existence　has　a　deeper　moral　significance．　Because　external
existences　are　distinct　and　independent，　it　is　a　natural　inference　to　believe
that　their　activity　must　be　derived　from　themselves；they　are　considered　to
have　their　own　principles　which　sustain　and　move　them．　This　is　the　genesis
of　the　idea　ofpower，　and　eventually　autonomy．　As　an　extension　of　this　idea，
other　people，　as　external　bodies，　are　recognised　as丘ee　agents　capable　of
spontaneous　activities．　This　is　the　natural　basis　fbr　ascdbing　to　other　people
the　right　to　freedom．　In　this　sense，　the　physical　perception　of　others　occurs
prior　to　moral　recognition，　and　the　idea　of　free　agency　is　fbunded　on　the
natural　stability　of　the　former．　Hence，　the　notions　of　power　and　spontaneity
are　by－products　of　the　imaginative　creation　of　extemal　o切ects．　We　regard
the　ohject　as　the　source　of　different　qualities．　By　supposing　this　origin　of
variable　perceptions，　perceptions　are　first　completed　and　become　available
fbr　stable　beliefs．　In　this　sense，　the　creation　of　external　ohlects　is　the
terminal　of　the　formation　of　physical　perceptions．　The　most　significant　of　all
external　bodies　are　human　beings．　It　is　possible　to　understand　the
recognition　of　people　as　the　underlying　o切ective　of　Hume，s　exposition，
which　is　not　at　all　implied　in　the　Cartesian　world　of　extension．　Thus　in　his
theory　of　extemal　bodies，　Hume　presents　the　theory　that　human　beings　are
supposed　to　be　independent，　have　their　own　qualities　which　comprise
character，22　and　their　own　principle　of　movement　which　is丘eedom．　This
means　that　when　we　recognise　others，　we　should　treat　them　as　such　in　order
to　have　a　stable　relationship　with　them．
　　There　is　a　moral　reason　to　regard　extemal　o切ects　and　human　beings　on　a
par．　The　quality　of　external　o切ects　is　treated　as　it　is　because　it　is　believed　to
be　distinct，　and　distinctiveness　is　the　most　appropriate　concept　fbr　perceiving
human　beings　because　morality　requires　us　to　respect　and　treat　human
beings　as　having　their　own　inherent　qualities．　To　regard　others　as　they　are　is
the　natural　significance　of　the　idea　of　recognition　which　leads　to　a　clearer
notion　of　morality，　which　includes　the　notions　of　freedom　or　moral　right．
Hume電s　sceptical　argument　about　extemal　o切ects　shows　that　nothing　is　solid
and　impenetrable　by　its　own　power．　What　confers　solidity　and
impenetrability　to　extemal　o切ects　is　our　mind　that　imagines　them　to　be
o切ective，　and　human　beings　are　solid　and　impenetrable　only　by　virtue　of
moral　perceptions　that　consist　in　the　general　point　ofview．
46
5．Concluding　Remarks
　　Ihave　argued　that　Descartes　and　Hume　have　opposed　theories　regarding
the　understanding　of　extemal　bodies．　Descartes　starts　fヒom　an　Archimedean
point　or　the　certainty　of　the　Cogito　in　which　the　example　of　certainty　lies，　to
demonstrate　the　separate　existence　of　extemal　bodies．　On　the　other　hand，
Hume　maintains　that　extemal　bodies　appears　as　the　final　product　of　our
belie£which　fbr　the　first　time　provides　the　sense　of　reliability　because　of　its
stability．　The　perception　of　external　ohjects　is　attained　by　obtaining　the
general　point　of　view　which　is　known　through　a　particular　feeling　as　in
moral　perception．　In　Hume，s　system，　clear　and　distinct　recognition　can　only
be　a　particular　manner　of　perception．　Thus　Hume　replaces　the　Cartesian
criterion　of”clear　and　distinct”perception　with　the　general　point　of　view23．
　　Don　Garrett　has　argued　that　two　of　Hume’s　most　important　principles　are
the”Copy　Principle”and　the”Separability　Principle’1．24　He　maintains　that
there　is　no　clear　source　fbr　Hume’s　Separability　Principle，　while　the　Copy
Principle　certainly　derives　from　Locke．　However，　it　is　now　arguable　that
Hume’s　Separability　Principle　can　be　an　alternation　of　the　Cartesian
”principle　of　separation”that　is　characterised　by　the　combination　of　clear
and　distinct　perception　and　God’s　almighty　power　and　veracity．25　The　general
point　ofview　naturally　distinguishes　certain　classes　ofperceptions　as　distinct
bodies．　In　this　way，　Hume　replaces　the　Cartesian　real　distinction　with　his
Separability　Principle．　It　is　also　possible　to　think　that　Hume　shares　with
Locke　a　critical　consciousness　of　the　Cartesian　theory　of　existence　in　his
adaptation　of　the　Copy　Principle．　By　the　Copy　Principle，　Hume　demolishes
the　Cartesian　distinction　between　idea　and　existence，　which　thus　makes　the
notion　of　substance　redundant．　And　by　the　Separability　Principle，　he　shows
how　individual　o切ects　are　articulated　by　the　working　of　imagination．
　　In　the　theory　of　external　existence，　Hume　presents　the　principle　fbr
unifying　the　perception　of　human　beings　and　other　o切ects，　while　Descartes
confines　the　scientific　perception　of　external　objects　to　geometrical
recognition．　Thus　Hume　presents　a　totally　different　notion　of　human　beings
from　that　based　on　the　Cartesian　Cogito．　It　is　easy　to　see　that　Hume，s
explanation　of　a　person　as　an　extemal　o切ect　leads　to　the　denial　of　personal
identity　as　posited　by　the　Cogito．　Here　is　the　continuity　of　Hume’s　theory　of
extemal　body　and　that　of　personal　identity．　Although　Descartes　concludes
Hume’s’，General　Point　ofView附and　Descartes，，℃lear　and　Distinct　Perception「，　47
the　Sixth　Meditation　by　pointing　out　the　weakness　of　human　natUre，　Hume
severely　criticises　the　Cartesian　separation　of　science　from　common　life，　and
goes　on　to　argue　that　moral　perception　and　its　validity　can　depend　only　upon
human　natUre．　This　indicates　the　difference　in　the　science　they　purport　to
establish．26
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